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In the Sttpreltle Cottt•t of the 
State of Utah 
MARCELLA JENSEN TUTrLE; and 
RICHARD DALE TUTTLE, a minor, 
by his Guardian ad litem, Marcella 
Jensen Tuttle, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EX-
PRESS COMPANY, a corporation, 
and HEATH H. CORNETTE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NO. 7619 
The "Statement of Facts" set out in appellants' brief, 
and particularly that portion purporting to describe how 
the collision in question happened, is so distorted that we 
feel impelled to make a new statement, showing in detail 
what the evidence established. Counsel for defendants and 
appellants, far from fairly summarizing the evidence,. or 
recognizing the evidence supporting the verdict of the jury, 
have simply mentioned carefully selected extracts of that 
part of the testimony which they believe supports their the-
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ory, a theory rejected by the jury. Beyond that, they 
have stated as a fact their naked conclusions that the col-
lision occurred as their theory suggested. 
They seem not to recognize that they are not support-
ing the verdict of a jury in their favor, in which case there 
might be some justification in merely reciting the facts and 
conclusions favorable to them. They are endeavoring to 
upset the verdict of a jury squarely against them. They 
should not attempt to do this by ~closing their eyes to the 
record in support of the jury's verdict. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record establishes that· Dale Tuttle was a young 
man of splendid habits. At the time of his death he was 
twenty-one years of age (Tr.173). After being discharged 
from the Navy, he married the plaintiff, Marcella J~sen 
Tuttle, whom he had known in junior high school before 
the war (Tr. 84). He had a- good job and steady income 
which he devoted to family purposes (Tr. 186). At the 
time of his death, his wife was about four months pregnant 
(Tr. 187). The baby was born before the time of the trial 
-a boy, in the custody of, and supported by, Marcella (Tr. 
187). 
On t~e evening of January 15th, 1949, Dale Tuttle, 
who had haq supper with his wife and her folks in Spring-
ville, left home ·at 8:30 p.m. for the purpose of going to 
Provo· to take part in a bowling match. The time he left 
is fixed positively by various witnesses, and there was no 
evidence adduced to the contrary (Tr. 145, 154, 177, 183, 
189). . From the deceased's. home to the point of the col· 
lision is 3. 7 miles (Tr. 159). The night was cold; and the 
roads were exceedingly slick (Tr. 111, 164, 242, 395). It 
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was during the \Vorst part of the most severe winter ex-
perienced in this section for many years-the winter of 
1948-1949. 
The collision happened just 5 or 6 minutes after Dale 
Tuttle left his home in Springville, bound for Provo to the 
north, being at 8:35 or 8:36 p,m. (Tr. 325-326). The speed 
recorder in the P. I. E. truck positively fixed the time of 
the collision, as did various witnesses (Tr. 325-326). The 
ambulance operator, who kept a time log, was called at 8:40 
p.m., some 5 minutes after the crash (Tr. 193). 
Immediately preceding 8:35p.m., as shown by the auto-
matic recorder in the P. I. E. truck (Plaintiffs' Ex. 16, Tr. 
314) and by numerous witnesses, the defendant driver was 
operating his heavy equipment southward along Springville 
Road at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour (Tr. 26, 35, 
46, 80, 111, 279, 280, 326, 408), with his horn held down 
almost constantly (Tr. 31, 35, 44, 51, 79, 395), flashing his 
lights on low and high beam (Tr. 261) and he passed the 
Roberts car, the Payne car, the Stevenson car and finally 
the Holt-Beardall car shortly before the collision in ques-
tion, causing strong wind and throwing up swirls of snow 
which interfered with the vision of the other drivers (Tr. 
26, 35, 44, 382, 422). The evidence also shows that as he 
made a slight curve in the road shortly before the scene of 
the collision, he passed from the center line of the highway 
onto his left, or wrong, side and about that time, apparently 
lost control of his truck which went into a skid (Tr. 58, 136, 
137). 
The witnesses, Beardall and Holt, the latter an em-
ployee of the State Tax Commission (Tr. 134) were driving 
south and were passed by the defendants' truck almost im-
mediately before the collision (Tr. 113, 137). There were 
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no cars proceeding south ahead of the Holt-Beardall car 
('rr. 113, 135), but there was a ·car corning north toward 
them shortly before the truck passed them, which could 
have been only the Tuttle car (Tr. 136). Just after the 
truck passed the Holt-Beardall car, leaving a swirl of snow 
in its wake and interfering with .their vision, there was a 
flash up ahead, the electric light wires over the road fell 
down and Beardall, the driver, had difficulty in stopping 
just short of the wires which were going down across the 
road (Tr. 113, 137). Beardall backed his car across the 
road to the east (Tr. 114, 137). 
Beardall and Holt first saw the truck over on the east 
side of the road and a passenger car, later identified as the 
Tuttle car, north and farther east from it. There were no 
other cars in that vicinity and the Beardall-Holt car was 
the first at the scene of the accident. Beardall, on the east 
side of the highway, threw his headlights on the wrecked 
car, and Hblt and Beardall got out to try to help (Tr. 114, 
137). Their car was seen on the east side by a number of 
witnesses, and they were identified by others as being there 
when they came up (Tr. 36, 37, 97, 423, 424). Shortly aft-
er· Holt and Beardall pulled their car over to the east side 
of the highway, Mrs. Ellis and Mr. Stevenson drove up to 
the wires in a car driven by the latter (Tr. 97, 116). Be-
cause they were conscious of another car being ahead of 
them ·proceeding south (the Holt-Beardall car), and be-
cause there was no other car on the right-hand, or west, 
side of the road when they drove up, they concluded that 
the car involved in the accident was the car·which had been 
in front of them, not noticing at the time the Holt-Beardall 
ear over on the east side of the highway (Tr. 92, 107, 409). 
They so mentioned their impression to the officer in the 
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immediate presence of the truck driver, and on this mis-
taken impression the defense of the defendants is based-
that the passenger car involved in the crash was going 
south (Tr. 240, 241). 
The investigating officer based his preliminary inves-
tigation on such mistaken impression, but when he had an 
opportunity of learning all the facts, he changed his report 
to show that the Tuttle car was proceeding north (Tr. 241). 
The investigator for the defendant company joined the 
driver at the home of the impressionable McPhies (Tr. 306) 
who also subscribed to this erroneous impression, and the 
truck driver, the MoPhies and the investigator must have 
spent some time together. The investigator took state-
ments from various witnesses in his own handwriting in 
which he omitted many things which were told him that 
appeared favorable to the deceased (Tr. 81, 105, 429, 432). 
In the meantime, Tuttle's folks, who knew the direction 
in which he was proceeding, and Holt and Beardall, who 
knew he was not driving south, were at the hospital. Holt 
and Beardall, as soon as Tuttle was identified, left the 
scene to notify his wife of the tragedy. It was only after 
the investigating officer at the hospital was able to talk to 
Holt and Beardall that he obtained the truth as to the di-
rection the Tutt~e car was going, and he then changed his 
report to show that it was going north (Tr. 240, 241, 254). 
Afterwards, Stevenson also indicated to Mrs. Ellis that 
they were mistaken in their impression that the Tuttle car 
was the one in front of them going south (Tr. 107.) , and 
Mrs. Ellis positively testified that the car in front of them 
was about a block ahead, and that her original impression 
\Vas erroneous, the Holt-Beardall car being on the east side 
of the road (Tr. 97, 108). The testimony of Cornette, the 
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driver of the defendant vehicle, and that of the McPhies, 
who persisted in the fiction based upon Stevenson's eiTone-
ous impression, was so contradictory, unbelievable and con-
trary to established physical facts, that the jury could not 
have given any credence to it. 
Since the peculiar facts in the case will dispose of most 
of the law arguments of defendants, we take the liberty of 
giving further details with specific reference to the record. 
The P. I. E. driver had left his home in South Salt Lake 
City or Murray, Utah, and driven to the scene of the acci-
dent, a distance of 41 miles, in 1 hour and 10 minutes (Tr. 
316) . The gross weight of the P. I. E. outfit was between 
sixty and sixty-four thousand pounds (Tr. 260). The }(}-
cation of the accident was 3.7 miles north of Dale Tuttle's 
home on the main highway between Springville and Provo 
(Tr. 159) and was 1.6 miles south of the semaphore light 
at Seventh East and Third South Streets in Provo, Utah 
(Tr. 159) which is about 10 blocks from downtown Provo. 
The evening of the collision, the P. I. E. truck passed 
Charles M. Roberts, one of the witnesses for the plaintiff, 
going south, about % of a mile north of the ·collision (Tr. 
25). The P. I. E. truck was going at a high rate of speed 
(Tr.· 26), was blowing its horn, and Roberts pulled off the 
main part of the road into a snow bank; the snow from the 
P. I. E. truck covered the windshield and headlights and 
Roberts had to get off the highway and wipe off the wind-
shield before he could go on (Tr. 26). 
Just prior to the accident, the P. I. E. truck passed 
Douglas Payne, another witness for the plaintiffs, who was 
delivering papers for The Deseret News. The truck passed 
Payne about a block and a half north of "Lou's Place." 
Payne heard a loud blast of the horn two or three times 
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and the truck came by, going pretty fast and blew snow 
and wind inside of the car (Tr. 35). The truck went up 
the road with a s\virl of snow following the back of the 
truck (Tr. 36). Payne thought the truck was going about 
50 miles an hour (Tr. 35). When Payne got to the scene 
of the accident, he saw a car parked on the east side of the 
road, .facing south, and he parked behind it (Tr. 36, 37). 
This car was the Holt-Beardall car. 
Dellis Elliott and his brother, Gordon, just before the 
collision, were standing on the road about a block north of 
"Lou's Place," when after sounding its horn, the P~ I. ·E. 
truck passed a car just opposite Dellis, just as the car was 
passing (Tr. 45). There were one or two other cars fifty 
yards behind the car passed near Dellis Elliott ( Tr. 4 7) . 
At the time the truck passed Dellis Elliott, there were no 
other cars ahead of the truck (Tr. 51). The truck didn't 
honk any more after it passed Dellis Elliott (Tr. 51). 
Jean Elliott, the mother of Dellis and Gordon, stated 
that her boys were hitchhiking a ride to Springville to go 
to the basketball game, and that when she heard a loud 
honking, she was afraid about the boy~ being out on the 
road too far. She went out on the porch of her home and 
saw the truck passing a car near a street light in front of 
their place (Tr. 54, 55, 56). 
Gordon Elliott, brother of Dellis, testified that when 
the truck passed them, it was passing another car (Tr. 56) . 
He testified that the truck was traveling in the middle of 
the road (Tr. 56), and that the truck was more to the east 
of the road when it passed him (Tr. 74); that it was most 
east of center (Tr. 74); and when it passed them, it cut 
across the bend in the road to the east side (Tr. 75) . 
Carol Ellis testified that she was riding in a car with 
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C. E. Stevenson the night of the collision and that they 
were following another car (Tr. 79). That she heard a 
horn blowing somewhere behind them and the truck passed 
them in the middle of the road going about 50 or 55 miles 
an hour (Tr. 80). After the truck passed them, so testi-
fied Mrs. Ellis, it started swaying (Tr. 87). She and Ste-
venson drove up to the wire which had fallen across the 
road and when they arrived at the scene of the accident , 
there was another car backed on the opposite (east) side 
of the road facing the wreck (Tr. 82). Mrs Ellis testified 
that she first thought that the car they had been following 
was the car involved in the accident (Tr. 90), but changed 
her mind later when she talked to Mr. Stevenson (Tr. 107). 
She definitely recalled seeing a car there that night when 
they first arrived, but did not know whether it was the one 
they had been following, but she did see a car with its head-
lights on (Tr. 97). 
Clifford Beardall, another witness for the plaintiffs, 
testified that the night of the accident, he was accompanied 
by Ernest L. Holt and was driving in the vicinity of Lou's 
Place when the truck passed him (Tr. 110-111) and that 
when it passed hin1, the wind caused a movement of his car 
(Tr. ·111). He further testified that the truck was over the 
center of the highway (Tr. 112). Beardall testified that 
there was no car in front of him going south at the time 
the truck passed him (Tr. 113). He stopped his car about 
eight inches from the wires as they fell down; he immedi-
ately backed his car to the east and pulled up until his lights 
hit the scene of the accident (Tr. 114). At the time of his 
arrival, there was no one at -the scene of the accident and 
after observing the person in the wrecked' car, he went to 
direct traffic which was then coming both ways (Tr. 116). 
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Beardall further testified that he at first didn't recognize the 
deceased (Tr. 115) but later learned that it was Dale Tuttle 
(Tr. 118), and as soon as Tuttle was put into the ambu-
lance, he went to Springville to notify his family (Tr. 120). 
Ernest L. Holt, the passenger in the Beardall car, tes-
tified that the only other vehicle in front of them was one 
going over the Infirmary Hill towards Springville, where 
he could just see its tail lights (Tr. 135). Holt has been 
District Auditor of the Provo office of the State Tax Com-
mission for 13 years (Tr. 134). He testified that the truck 
passed them near Lou's Place and when it passed them it 
was straddling the center line, and as it went on, it went 
over further to the east side of the highway (Tr. 136). He 
testified that just before the truck passed, there was a car 
coming from the south about half-way down the Infirmary 
Hill; after the truck passed the Beardall automobile it. went 
over into the inside lane of the north-bound traffic- and 
after that, there was a flash of light and he saw a wire fall 
across the highway and Holt called Beardall's attention to 
stop the car (Tr. 137). Hlolt testified that when they ar-
rived at the scene of the accident and backed on the east 
of the highway, no one else had arrived at the scene of the 
accident (Tr. 136). 
Holt further testified that shortly after they got over 
to the east side of the highway, the cars started coming 
but they had sufficient time to back the Beardali car over 
and get the lights on the wreck before any other cars ap-
proached (Tr. 136). 
Elmer Roberts, a witness for the plaintiffs, who was 
called on plaintiffs' rebuttal, testified that he had been 
one of the pedestrians accompanying Mr. and -Mrs. McPhie, 
witnesses for the defendants, and that when he ran up to 
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the scene of the accident, Mr. Beardall was standing out in 
the middle of the road, although he didn't recall seeing Mr. 
Beardall's automobile backed on the east, but did know 
that there was light on the scene of the accident and it 
could have been from headlights of a car (Tr. 423 and 424). 
Although none of the witnesses for the plaintiffs 
claimed to have seen the acual impact, except for the flash 
of lights, their testimony was clear and :convincing that 
there was no impact on the west side of the highway and 
no passenger car driving south where the impact occurred. 
Holt saw the car coming from the south to\vard the north 
immediately prior to the impact and that was the only car 
in that vicinity and could have been none other than the 
Tuttle car as there were no other cars there when Holt and 
Beardall arrived. It is true that some of the witnesses for 
the defendants believed that Stevenson, who was traveling 
south, had been following the car in which the deceased was 
riding, and that some of the witnesses for the defendants 
claimed to have seen the impact, but in examining the tes-
timony of the witnesses who claimed to have seen the im-
pact, it was clearly demonstrated that the collision could 
not have happened in the way they testified; that the wit-
nesses were subject to false impressions and the only rea-
sonable conclusion that could be reached by the jury was 
that the Tuttle automobile at the time._ of the impact was 
proceeding north. 
From an examination of plaintiffs' Ex. GG, it will be 
seen that the -point at which the Elliott boys were standing 
Vt"hen the truck passed them was approximately 1,500 feet 
from the point of impact and that Lou's Place was aproxi-
mately 1,000 to 1,100 feet from the point of the impact. 
The testimony of the Elliott boys, and particularly Dellis 
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Elliott, was that there was no other car in front of the car 
that the truck passed near the Elliott boys; thus Holt's and 
Beardall's testimony was fully corroborated. 
II. STATEMENT OF POINTS 
We will follow the general order of treatment speci-
fied in appellants' brief, but will present our argument un-
der the three major headings, since it is impractical in many 
respects to segregate the material under the sub-headings 
set out by appellants. We shall also consider the points 
concerning the denial of a directed verdict and the denial 
of a new trial under the same heading. 
Respondents claim that: 
1. Defendants' motion for a directed verdict was prop-
erly denied by the courtt as was defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
(a) The collision was caused· by the defendants' 
own negligence and was not contributed to by the de-
ceased. 
(b) The jury found from ample evidence that 
the deceased was traveling north, according to the the-
ory of the plaintiffs. 
(c) Proximate callS? and all other necessary ele-
/ 
ments of plaintiffs' case are fully and amply _supported 
by the evidence. 
2. The court's instructions when considered as a 
whole, were correct, and fully and correctly set forth the 
theories of both plaintiffs and defendants and the law ap-
plicable thereto, and no prejudicial error was involved in 
any instruction. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
3. Defendants' counsel on cross-examination, himself, 
brought out the matter of insurance in response to his own 
question., and the mention of insurance was not prejudicial 
in any respect. 
1. Defendants' motion for a directed verdict and a new 
trial were properly denied. 
Counsel for defendants cites numerous cases in 
support of the proposition that a motorist proceeding in the 
same direction as a car following, who makes a left turn 
directly in front of the oncoming motorist, is either solely 
negligent or at least contributorily negligent. With this 
proposition, we have no quarrel. Both sides of the contro-
versy in this case in the argument, agreed that the material 
question and the ultimate fact to be determined by the jury 
was whether the decedent, just, prior to the collision 
was driving south or was driving north. This question was 
submitted to the jury and the jury determined that the de-
cedent was traveling north just prior to the impact; conse-
quently, the cases cited by counsel for the defendants could 
have no bearing upon the ultimate decision in this case, and 
we submit counsel are merely- trying to cloud the issue here. 
Not one case has been cited by the defendants to indicate 
that if the deceased were traveling north, recovery should 
not be had.-
We admit now, and we conceded at the trial, that if 
the jury found that immediately prior to the collision, the 
Tuttle car was proceeding south and turned directly in front 
of-the oncoming P. I. E. truck, as claimed by the defend· 
ants, the defendants would not be liable. The evidence, 
however, abundantly established the opposite. 
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and motion 
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for a new trial should not have been granted and were prop-
erly denied because, even if the evidence did not show be-
yond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was traveling 
north, it did show by a quantum of proof that is convincing 
to reasonable men that he was going north. The evidence 
further tends to show that the sole defense of the defend-
ants was based upon a mere mistake or fiction. 
There is, in fact, no contributory negligence, either 
claimed, alleged or proved on the theory that the deceased 
\Vas driving north\vard. Every claim of contributory negli-
gence made by defendants is predicated on the fiction that 
the deceased was driving south. There being abundant evi-
dence to support the fact that he was going north, and the 
jury so having found, there is not even a claim or pleading 
of any kind to support appellants' arguments of contribu-
tory negligence. 
Plaintiffs abundantly established that the deceased 
was traveling north at the time of the collision by the des .. 
tination of the deceased as Provo immediately before the 
collision, by the time element as to when he left Spring .. 
ville, by positive testimony that there was no vehicle going 
south in front of the BeardaU .. Holt car, and by the positive 
testimony of Holt that there was a car approaching the 
scene from the south going north immediately prior to the 
collision, which could have been only the Tuttle car. The 
physical facts themselves effectually negatived any idea 
that the Tuttle car, being, when it stopped, considerably 
north and east of the tractor and trailer, could have been 
going south. No one, moreover, can question that the de-
ceased met his death as a result of the collision with the 
P. I. E. truck. 
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Defendants say that the verdict should not be based 
upon speculative evidence. To that we may agree. But 
every necessary fact is established by affirmative evidence. 
Certainly, circumstantial evidence is often more convinc-
ing than direct. 
Where is the assumed or supposed fact in this case 
which is not confirmed by proof? ·There is no question but 
that the deceased met his death as a result of a collision 
\vith the P. I. E. truck. It is positively established that 
there were no cars in front of the Beardall-Holt car on the 
west side of the street, but that there was a ·car approach-
ing from the south toward the north just before the col-
lision which could have been none other than the Tuttle 
car. The fact is abundantly established that defendant 
driver was speeding, crossed to the wrong side of the high-
way, and lost control of his vehicle, which skidded side-
ways. 
There is no question but that the decedent was where 
he had a right to be, and that his death was proximately 
caused by the negligence of the defendants. 
The proximate cause of the decedent's death is not left 
to conjecture. In cases cited by defendants in their brief, 
the death \Vas caused in one of two ways, there being no 
proof as to which- manner was involved. If it were caused 
one \Vay, the defendants would have been responsible; if it 
were caused another way, the defendants would not have 
been responsible. Irt the cases cited by defendants, it could 
not be determined in which manner death occurred. The-
court held that the jury had to determine from a prepon-
derance of the evidence in order to hold the defendant 
liable, that the death occurred in the manner for which the 
def 2'-ndant \vould be Hable. Of course, if the probabilities 
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are equally balanced and there is no evidence tending to 
show the fact, then the defendant would prevail. The cases 
cited by the defendants are very different from the instant 
case. There are no inferences based upon inferences here. 
It has been held that in an action for negligently caus-
ing the death of a brakeman, plaintiff may rely on physical 
facts to show that the train moved while deceased was be-
tween the cars, though the conductor testified negatively 
that he did not observe it move. Perrin v. Union Pac. R. 
R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405; certiorari denied, 42 S. Ct. 
270, 257 u. s. 661. 
If there is evidence from which jury, as reasonable 
men, can find the existence of a disputed fact, it is not 
"speculation" simply because there is equally strong evi-
dence from which they could have arrived at an opposite 
conclusion. Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 111 
Utah 541, 180 P.2d 532. 
The fact finder is not always required to believe the 
uncontradicted testimony of a witness. Gagos v. Industrial 
Commission, 87 Utah 101, 48 P.2d 449; rev. 87 Utah 92, 39 
P.2d 697. 
Although the trier of facts in determining where truth 
lies must not arbitrarily, capriciously nor without adequate 
reason reject testimony, he should not accept testimony 
. founded in ignorance, confusion, mistake, bias, preJudice or 
falsehood merely because no other witness testified con-
versely. Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522, 88 P.2d 549; 
a.ffirming 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d 311. 
· For purpose of supporting judgment, it is immaterial 
from which side the evidence comes. Haycraft v. Adams, 
82 Utah 347, 24 P.2d 1110. 
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Where plaintiff's witness and .defendants' witness· give 
conflicting testimony, a jury is entitled to believe the testi-
mony of plaintiff's witness. Schlatter v. McCarthy, __ _ 
Utah , 196 P.2d 968; rehearing denied, 198 P.2d 473. 
Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224. 
It has further been said that testimony contrary to 
uncontroverted physical facts is not substantial evidence. 
Hearstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 
262 Pac. 100 . 
While a jury cannot arbitrarily reject testimony, it 
need not accept it when it is rendered improbable or doubt-
ful by circumstances. Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah 351, 
113 Pac. 77. 
The whole defense of the defendants that the deceased 
\vas going south was originally predicated on a misunder-
standing. It was not explained and never could be explained 
by defendants or their counsel why in the limited time be-
tween the time Dale Tuttle left his home and the scene of 
of the crash he would, or could, drive to, ar toward Provo, 
then make a 180-degree turn back toward Springville, and 
then with this huge tractor and trailer, lights flashing and 
horn blowing, bearing do\vn upon him, suddenly make an-
other 180-degree turn directly into the path of the truck. 
It was never explained how the light touring car of Tuttle, 
if it were traveling south and turned in front of a truck 
going 50 miles an hour or better, cotdd end up almost im-
mcdia tely east of the claiined point of impact, on the ex-
treme east side of the· road, ·while the truck ended up con-
siderably to the south. Had the accident happened as de-
fendants claimed, it is apparent that the lighter car would 
h3.ve been knocked farther south and to the \vest of the 
road, while it is natural that Tuttle, traveling north, and 
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trying to turn to the right to avoid the careening truck on 
the east side of the road, slid into such truck sideways, be-
ing pushed off farther north from where the truck stopped. 
One has but to examine the conflicting testimony of 
the driver Cornette to see why the jury could not believe 
him or the other witnesses for the defendants. At the hear-
ing, Cornette testified , that he noticed that the first car 
which he passed was a light one and the second one was 
dark, and positively had a recollection of that before the 
impact (Tr. 287), but he admitted on cross-examination 
that he had testified at the time of the taking of his depo-
sition sometime previous to the trial that he did not notice 
the color of the cars at all but just noticed there were cars, 
and admitted that he had testified that his observation of 
the Tuttle car was based on what he had seen after the ac-
cident (Tr. 301). 
At the trial, Cornette testified that he didn't try to 
turn "in no direction" at the time of the accident but ad-
mitted that he had given a statement to the company that 
he applied his brake as fast as possible and that he attempt-
ed to turn to the right to avoid the other car (Tr .. , 304). 
In reading the record, and particularly the testimony 
of Cornette, one cannot but feel that he was not telling the 
truth and in view of his testimony and the testimony of Mr. 
and Mrs. McPhie, setting forth occurrences that were im-
possible because of the physical facts, the jury concluded, 
and rightly, that prior· to the impact, the Tuttle car was 
going north, and returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs for damages, the amount of which is not complained 
of by plaintiffs. 
We ask the Court to carefully read the record and ex-
amine the exhibits: the pictures taken by the police officer 
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that night, giving some indication of the bitter, cold and 
slippery conditions prevailing, and the huge equipment 
which the defendant driver was so recklessly operating; the 
speed recorder of the truck showing that at the time of the 
impact the truck was exceeding 50 miles per hour, which 
may have been all right for a dry, sunny day,.but by virtue 
of the very nature of the conditions existing that night was 
highly reckless under the ·circumstances; the pictures show-
ing the pole near which the Tuttle vehicle stopped and the 
type of roadway involved; the map showing the distance 
farther north where the defendants' vehicle came. to rest; 
the officer's report showing how he first fixed the direction 
of travel of the Tuttle car on the mistaken impression of 
Stevenson, but showing later how he changed the direction 
"south" to "north" after he had had an opportunity of talk-
ing to Beardall and Holt at the hospital and completing his 
investigation; the statements of witnesses taken. by the de-
fendants' investigator in his own handwriting in which he 
left out anything that would be favorable to plaintiffs, as 
show~ by Holt, Beardall, Ellis and Roberts. 
We ask the Court to consider that these statements 
were taken, beginning first at the McPhie residence where 
the truck driver stayed with the investigator until the early 
hours of the morning. We ask the Court to consider how, 
if the truck going more than 50 miles an hour, hit tbe Tuttle 
car as it wag, proceeding in the same direction and suddenly 
turned in front, it could, under any stretch of the imagina-
tion, shoot as almost a right angle over to the extreme east 
side of the highway, while the truck ended up a considerable 
distance to the south and not as far east. 
We ask the Court to consider the .admitted fact that 
the: defendants' driver could not identify even the color of 
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the Tuttle car, basing his knowledge only on what he saw 
after the car came to rest. If the physical facts themselves, 
as shown by the exhibits, are considered, we believe that 
the defendants' version must be considered impossible. An 
analysis of all the evidence shows that it was impossible. 
Counsel for the defendants, both in opening statement 
to the jury and in argument, admitted that the controlling 
issue. and the one which would ultimately determine the 
case, was the direction in \vhich the deceased was going 
just prior to the impact. We reiterated counsel's statement. 
The jury determined that the deceased was going north. 
Now, counsel should not be heard to complain that the jury 
decided on the evidence against his contention. . The ques-
tion should be, and is, the ultimate and final determination. 
The case of Larkey v. Church (Okla) 192 Pac. 569, 
cited by defendants, is interesting, and the headnote sets 
forth pretty well the holding: 
''The act of driving an automobile on the wrong 
side of the street, in violation of a city ordinance, at the 
time when an accident by collision occurs, is of itself 
prima facie evidence of negligence. However, that 
presumption of negligence may be overcome by proof; 
but the burden is upon the party so wrongfully using 
the streets to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the fact that he was driving on the wrong side of 
the street was not the proximate cause of the collision." 
In the instant case, the record is replete with evidence 
that the defendant Heath Cornette was on the wrong side 
of the road at the time of, and just before, the impact. The 
jury believed that the deceased was at the time traveling 
north. There was no evidence to show contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the deceased-no evidence to show 
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that the negligence of the defendant, ·Heath Cornette, was 
not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damage if the 
jury should adopt plaintiffs' theory, which it did. All evi-
dence and reasonable inferences therefrom are resolved 
most favorably to plaintiff as against a motion for a directed 
verdict. Roach v. Kyremes, Utah , 211 P.2d 
181. 
The trial court which heard the case denied defend-
ants' motion for a new trial, obviously feeling that justice 
had been done, as indeed it has been. The court's action 
should not be disturbed on appeal. Valiotis v. Utah-Apex 
Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 Pac. 802. Moser v. Zion's 
Co-op Mercantile Institution, Utah , 197 P.2d 
136. 
2. The court did not err in instructing the jury. 
We first present our position in summary. 
The theories of the parties were fairly and fully pre-
sented to the jury and the question resolved itself into the 
jury's determination of whether the Tuttle car was going 
north or south. There was no possibility of confusion or 
prejudice. Any technical objections which defendants have 
raised could not have been prejudicial in any respect. 
The court did not err in giving instruction No. 13, and 
the jury could have been in no way misled by such instruc-
tion. 
Instructions numbered 14 and 15 must be read in the 
light of other instructions and in that connection were cor-
rect. In no way could they have been prejudicial. 
Defendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 and 17 were 
properly refused, since they were merely repetitious and 
the court in its instruction No. 4 gave instructions even 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
more favorable to the defendants, instructing the jury in 
effect that if the deceased were going south and turned in 
front of the defendants' truck, there could be no recovery 
in any event, no matter what the speed or manner of oper-
ation of the truck were. Also in instruction No. 11, the 
same matter was covered in a form more favorable to the 
defendants. In fact, the defendants secured instructions 
from the court amounting in effect to the instruction that 
if the deceased was driving southward, there could be no 
recovery in any event. 
The court did not err in its instructions Nos. 6 and 9, 
such instructions being correct statements both standing 
alone and in view of other instructions; in fact, instruction 
No. 6 was unduly favorable to the defendants as it told the 
jury that if they found that the deceased was guilty of any 
acts of negligence pled by defendants proximately contrib-
uting to the accident, they should return "No cause of ac-
tion". Defendants' requests Nos. 7 and 9 were properly re-
jected. Insofar as they were proper, they were covered by 
other instructions. 
The court did not err in giving instruction No. 1. This 
instruction merely recited the various allegations of the 
parties and clearly stated that such allegations were denied 
by the opposing parties. There were no allegations recited 
concerning the conduct of the defendants of which there 
was not adequate evidence. On the other hand, some alle-
gations were recited in that instruction as against plaintiffs 
upon which there was no evidence, such as the deceased's 
claimed "failing to slow down or turn out to avoid the col-
lision." However, in view of the instructions of the court 
clearly defining the controlling issue and presenting the 
theory of each party, there was, and could be, no prejudice. 
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Any abstract instructions given by the court were 
proper statements of the law and were in no way mislead-
ing, confusing or prejudicial. They were as favorable to 
the defendants as to the plaintiff, and probably more so, 
and in view of other instructions could not have prejudiced 
the defendants in any way. The defendants' requests which 
appellants argue should have been given were merely repe-
titious and, in most cases, were biased and argumentative 
reiterations of the single theory of the defendants, that the 
deceased was going south. They prefixed the instruction 
of the court to the effect that in any event if the decedent 
was going south and turned in front of the truck, there 
could be no recovery with a lot of arguments as to why the 
turning in front of the truck would bar recovery, and the 
requests were unnecessary and improper. 
Counsel for defendants object to the language in in-
struction No. 13 of the court and particularly "included in 
this duty to use due care and diligence is the duty to con-
stantly keep a lookout not only ahead but to the sides of 
his vehicle." They refer to the case of Morrison v. Perry, 
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772. Even in that case, the court 
felt that under some circumstances, there would be required 
a constant lookout. The court, in view of the dangerous 
conditions of the road, as brought out by the evidence, could 
well instruct as a matter of law that there was required a 
constant lookout. In any event, in ,considering the instruc-
tion as a whole, there could be no prejudice to the defend-
ants, for if the jury found the deceased was going south, it 
was instructed to find in effect for defendants, and if north, 
the .instruction \vas wholly immaterial as the truck would 
be on the wrong side of the road. 
The court did not· instruct that the defendant driver 
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should keep a constant lookout in "every direction" as 
stated by counsel for the defendants, but''. . . not only 
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle.'' That language must 
be given a reasonable construction. 
In the instant case, the court qualified his instruction 
and provided that the defendants would not be liable if the 
other person were negligent and his negligence proximately 
contributed to the injury. 
Instruction No. 14, to which objection is made by the 
defendants, only required that the defendant driver must 
maintain reasonable control over his automobile and take 
such measures as are reasonable to stop or tum to avoid 
a collision with other vehicles. This is no more than the 
law requires. The Affleck case cited by the defendants 
\Vent much further and could be interpreted by a jury to 
state that there was an absolute duty as in insuror, to avoid 
injuring anyone or colliding with any person on the high-
way. 
Taking instruction No. 15 as a whole, it cannot be seen 
how it could be in any way prejudicial, particularly in view 
of the fact that the jury obviously adopted plaintiffs' theory 
that the decedent was going north at the time of the impact 
and that the defendant Cornette was driving on the east 
and \Vrong side of the road. Defendants object to No. 15 on 
the claim that there was no evidence that defendant's speed 
was a proximate cause of the collision. Certainly the jury 
was instructed to find on the question of proximate cause 
in instruction No. 7 and the record was full of evidence of 
the tremendous speed of the defendant Cornette under the 
circumstances. If ever. there was a clear case of speed as 
one of the proximate causes, this is it. The speed was not 
disputed. There was evidence that the truck of the defend~--
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ants started to skid prior to the impact and there was noth-
ing to explain such skidding except speed. 
· The court's instruction No. 6, taken as a whole, to-
gether with the other instructions, covered the situation 
correctly, we believe, under the facts. If the jury believed 
that the deceased was going north, as they did, there would 
be no eye-witnesses as to any contributory negligence on 
the part of the deceased and he would be presumed free 
from negligence. 
The sum and substance of the matter as to the direc-
tion in which the deceased was traveling immediately prior 
to the impact was presented to the jury, and was deter-
mined, and such issue was so clear and determinative that 
any technical error should not be deemed prejudicial. In 
any event, the court did not instruct the jury that the pre-
sumption in favor of due care by the deceased was evidence, 
and correctly instructed the jury that the burden was on 
the defendants to show contributory negligence on the part 
of the deceased and that only in the absence of evidence, 
did such presumption prevail. There could have been, and 
was, no prejudicial error in this respect. 
The instructions of the court left no room for misun-
derstanding. The theories of the respective parties were 
clearly and expressly stated .. In its last analysis, the pri-
mary complaint of the appellants is that the jury did not 
believe their theory. We say that their theory cannot be 
believed in view of the ·contrary physical facts in evidence, 
the time element, the testimony of Hlolt and Beardall, which 
remained unimpeached, and all the other surrounding facts 
which, when analyzed, were consistent only with plaintiffs' 
theory. 
In final analysis, even though the deceased may have 
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had time, which he did not, to drive past the scene of the 
accident bound for Provo, then turn around without stop-
ping in Provo, and then just as this big tractor and trailer, 
with horn blowing and lights alternately on high and low 
beam, bore down upon him, turn around again without any 
discernable reason right into its path, the theory is fantas-
tic in and of itself. But be that as it may, at the very least 
there was a conflict of testimony as to the direction the 
Tuttle car was going, which was the whole crux of the case, 
and the court very clearly and properly submitted that con-
trolling question to the jury from the standpoints of the 
respeetive parties as follo\VS: 
"No. 3. You are instructed that plaintiffs' con-
tention is that at the time of the accident, the deceased, 
Dale Tuttle, was driving an automobile north on the 
highway at the time and place of the accident, and that 
the defendant, Heath H. c·omette, was driving defend-
ants' truck south upon said highway in th~ opposite 
direction, and that plaintiffs further claim that the de-: 
fendant Cornette carelessly and negligently turned and 
drove defendants' truck across the center line, and 
thereby proximately causing the collisionr 
"If you find by a preponderanc of the evidence 
that the defendants were negligent as claimed by the 
plaintiffs, the accident having occurred as claimed by 
the plaintiffs and that such negligence of the defend-
ants, if any, was the proximate cause of the death of 
Dale Tuttle, and if you further find from the evidence 
that the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for 
his own safety and was not himself guilty of negligence 
contributing to. his death, then you are instructed that 
it will be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the defendants in this action for 
damages to be fixed and assessed by you in accordance 
with instructions as herein given. 
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by not considering any other instruction, that an argument 
can be made against it. 
Defendants' requests on the question of presumption 
would have the jury believe that since McPhie claimed to 
be an eye-witness, they would in no event consider any pre-
sumption of due care, even though the jury believed that 
McPhie did not see the collision. The court in such event 
would be instructing the jury that they were bound to be-
lieve McPhie at all events, even as against the testimony 
of Roberts· and the other evidence showing that he could 
not have seen what he claimed. 
It was for the jury to say whether there was any credi-
ble evidence establishing the fact, and to adopt defendants' 
requests would have been to usurp the province of the jury 
and practically direct a verdict for defendants. What the 
court said was a correct statement of the law and the only 
proper way to leave the matter with the jury. Had the 
jury believed McPhie's evidence, the court had already in-
structed the jury that plaintiffs could not have recovered 
if the deceased were going south. In view of that, and the 
other instructions of the court, there was no possibility that 
the jury could have been misled. 
There was evidence to show (a) that defendant at the 
time of the impact was going approximately 52 miles an 
hour; (b) that the driver lost control of the truck prior to 
the impact; (c) that when passing other cars, defendant 
flashed his lights from high beam to lowbeam and again on 
high beam, which in connection with his other actions was 
calculated to ··confuse other drivers; (d) that driving con-
ditions were especially bad that night and that the defend-
ant driver operated the truck recklessly under the condi-
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side of the road. 
The jury could well find that all of these acts contribu-
ted to the death of Dale Tuttle. There was ample· evidence 
to support all of the allegations in the complaint. Cotmsel 
for defendants assert that ". certainly by no 
stretch of the imagination were lights a proximate cause of 
the collision." With this statement we do not agree. Evi-
dence was submitted that the defendant Cornette cut his 
truck across the curve; the lights of the truck would have 
been directly on the oncoming traffic. The flashing of the 
lights onto high beam, as was testified to, would have blind-
ed the eyes of Dale Tuttle, and this cause, together with 
other causes about which evidence was introduced, proxi~ 
mately caused the death of Dale Tuttle. There is no ques-
tion that there is, and was, ample evidence to support all 
of the allegations of negligence set forth in the complaint.· 
All reasonable men must agree that to pass other cars 
at a high speed, against oncoming traffic, with lights flash~ 
ing on high and low beam, would be likely to cause an acci-
dent and would not be due care. It is a complete answer 
that if Dale Tuttle were going north, the defendants do not 
even claim they would not be liable. There could be no pos-
sible prejudice· to the instructions complained of, since the 
direction in which the Tuttle car was proceeding fixed the 
liability under the peculiar circumstances of this case. 
We-call attention to Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to the effect that no error is ground for granting a 
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the pro-
ceedings must disregard any error or defect which does not 
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affect the substantial rights of the parties. This sound prin-
ciple was recognized under the statutes on procedure prior 
to the rule cited. 104-14-7 and 104-39-3, U. C. A. 1943. 
In the case of Fowler v. Medical Arts Building, 112 
Utah 367, 188 P.2d 711, the prevailing opinion, after admit-
ting that at least one issue was submitted to the jury on 
which there was no evidence and conceding that the instruc-
tions which involved a mere repetition of ambiguous plead-
ings were erroneous, held that in view of the circumstances · 
in the issues before the jury, the jury could not have been 
misled and the judgment was sustained. 
In the case at bar, the court did not fall into the error 
mentioned .in the Fowler case, except in a manner favorable 
to defendants. Even in instruction No. 1, the court men-
tioned no facts claimed by plaintiffs on which there was no 
evidence. The conflict between the respective theories was 
made clear and it was also clear that if the jury found that 
the deceased was going north it would return a verdict for 
the plaintiff, and if going south, for the defendants. No con-
fus.ion or mistake could have resulted. 
· Abstract instructions ordinarily do not constitute re-
versible error. See Section 121, p. 347, "Abstract instruc-
tions in civil cases," Reid's Bransons Instructions to Juries, 
Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., "An abstract proposition having no appli-
cation to tpe issues before the jury should not be given as 
an instruction, though correct in principle, for its tendency 
is to confuse and mislead but such an instruction will not 
ordinarily warrant a reversal unless the instruction has mis .. 
led the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party." 
The claimed abstract instructions here did have application 
to the issues. There could have been no prejudice. 
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On the other hand, it is settled that a trial court's re-
fusal to give requested instructions in a personal injury ac-
tion is not error where the substance of those requests is 
embodied in the court's instructions. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. 
Mercantile Institution, Utah , 197 P.2d 136·. 
Skeen v. Peterson, Utah , 196 P.2d 708. 
The case of Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 
Pae. 348, is referred to by defendants in support of their 
argument that prejudice \Viii be presumed. In the Jensen 
case, \Vhich involved a number of basic errors which vitally 
affected the shady line behveen uncertain fact situations, 
there was no question but that the errors were such as to 
affect the outcome. In our case, we do not believe that 
there was any substantial error for the reasons stated in 
this brief. It furthermore appears ·clear that if there were 
any errors committed, they could not have affected the re-
sult of the case. 
If the jury had found the deceased was traveling south 
there could have been, under the instructions, nothing but 
a "no cause of action" verdict; if north, not even the de-
fendants contend that the verdict could have been in their 
favor. The entire brief of defendants is based on the as-
sumption that the jury had to find that the deceased was · 
traveling south. The facts show that he was not so travel-
ing, and the defendants' real complaint is that the jury did 
not agree with defendants on this point. Had the jury 
f6Ulld the deceased was traveling south, there could have 
been no other result under the instructions than a verdict 
for defendants, and the court in substance so instructed the . 
jury. 
Whichever view the jury took on direction; substan-
tially determined the outcome. Any super-technical or mic-
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roscopic examination of the instructions indulged in by de-
fendants we believe comes well within the comment of the 
Utah Court in its de<:ision on the re-hearing in. the Jensen 
case, supra, (p. 362). 
''We think the better rule is that not all committed 
errors in the trial of a case are presumptively or prima 
facie prejudicial for some committed errors are merely 
abstract, or on their face immaterial, or otherwise are 
not in and of themselves calculated to do harm." 
8. Plaintiffs' counsel did not wrongfully or otherwise in-
ject insurance indemnification into the case. 
The fact is that on cross-examination of an opposing 
witness, counsel for the defendants, himself, first brought 
out the question of insurance. Any mention was occasioned 
by .defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel carefully avoided any ref-
erence to insurance or any questions designed to produce 
any mention. Interrogatories on insurance were even avoid-
ed by plaintiff on voir dire. 
The fact that the corporate defendant was a great com-
pany with whom all were familiar would make it unlikely 
that the question ·of insurance could make any. difference 
anyway. The jury was properly instructed· to disregard 
any mention of insurance by the witness Ellis, so originated 
by defendants' own counsel on cross-examination. 
In the instant case, after the question by counsel for 
defendants on cross-examination which first brought out 
the mention of insurance as quoted on page 61 of plaintiffs' 
brief, it is true that plaintiffs' counsel examined Mrs. Ellis 
and that she answered as quoted in plaintiff's brief. How-
ever, there was nothing in the context of the questions of 
plaintiffs' counsel which would enable him to anticipate 
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that there \Vould be a further reference to insurance. We 
quote the questions leading up to the last reference: 
"Q. About how long did Mr. Kunz talk to you, Mrs. 
Ellis? 
A. Oh, it was quite some time. 
Q. Talk to you more than once? 
A. No, he didn't. Just the once. 
Q. Where were you working at the time? 
A. I was working at Provo Clinical Laboratory. 
Q. \Vhat were you doing there? 
A. Assisting Mr. Creer with book work, and clinical. 
Q. Was this during office hours? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. What did he say to you?'' 
Plaintiffs' counsel never referred to Mr. Kunz as an in-
surance adjuster, as intimated by defendants' counsel, and 
any mention of insurance was a surprise to both counsel-
certainly ~o plaintiffs'. Mrs. Ellis, previously to the time 
mentioned by counsel for the defendants, had testified that 
she had not talked to the police officer who had come down 
to the scene of the accident (Tr. 88) and then, as counsel 
stated, the questions were asked which gave rise to the al-
leged objectionable statement with respect to an insurance 
investigator (Tr. 90). In examining the record, we cannot 
even now, ascertain to whom counsel referred when he 
asked, "Who did you make that statement to?" There had 
been a lot of questions asked between the time that counsel 
had been talking about the police officer and the time that 
he asked his question. The answer was no fault of the 
plaintiffs nor of their counsel; it came as much of a surprise 
to plaintiffs as to defendants. There was no intent on the 
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part of plaintiffs or counsel that such a statement should be 
made, nor any knowledge thereof. The case of Morrison 
v. 'Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, cited by defendants 
herein was very much different. The court in this case 
stated on page 779, para. 17: 
"It is apparent the only purpose for such persistent 
questioning was to tell the jury that defendant was in-
sured. From the record it appears that plaintiff's coun-
sel knew that Mr. Williams was employed by the in-
surance company and consequently he could anticipate 
the witness' answer. We need not cite authority for 
the proposition that the question of indemnity insur-
ance in a. case such as this is irrelevant. It is also a 
well known fact that juries are influenced in determin-
ing liability and the amount of recovery by the fact 
that an insurance company w9uld pay the damages. 
·By this we do not say that in some cases a referenca 
to insurance is not proper.'' 
In the Morrison case, the fact was apparent that the 
questioning was for the apparent purpose of getting the 
matter of insurance before the jury .. · No such thing existed 
in this case. In fact, defendants' contention is somewhat 
far-fetched when you come right down to it, because de-
-fendants' O'Wll question brought the reference out. More-
over, the jury was properly instructed to disregard the ref-
erence. We also have the fact that the defendant, being a 
huge interstate transport company, could hardly have been 
prejudiced by the mention of insurance. 
The whole essence of all the cases cited by the defend-
ants in connection with this matter, including the Arizona 
case of Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 66 P.2d 246, 
hinges on the matter of intention and design to bring out 
the matter of insurance-. It would be a peculiar commen-
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tary, if the defendants in this case, when the case has gone 
against them, after they, unintentionally or otherwise, 
brought out the matter of insurance, could successfully 
assert that their O\vn mention of insurance by a witness 
was reversible error. 
The case of Poland v. Dunbar (Maine) 157 Atl. 381, 
cited by defendants, emphasized this view as to the intent 
and design to bring out the matter of insurance. In read-
ing the cases cited by defendants, it may be seen that in all 
of them there has been such design and intent to bring out 
the matter of the insurance. That is the thing that is con-
demned by the courts. In addition, in the Tuttle case at 
bar, the matter was ordered stricken from the record by 
the court. The cases examined, for the most part, treat 
situations where the plaintiff's counsel elicits the answers. 
Here, there could be no question of prejudice anyway, for 
the P. I. E. corporation, as the jury well knew, and as 
pointed out above, was financially responsible for any ver-
dict. 
In the case of Hankins v. Hall (Okla) 54 P.2d 609, 
cited by defendants, the determintaive question seemed to 
be the matter of whether or not the plaintiff was responsible 
therefor. 
In 56 ALR 1418, and following, there is an annotation 
covering the matter. On page 1451, the rule is stated as 
follows: 
"Obviously, information volunteered by a witness 
to the effect that the defendant carries liability insur-
ance is as harmful and prejudicial as responsive testi-
mony to that effect, and should be promptly stricken 
out, yet, as a general· rule, the admission of voluntary 
unresponsive statements of this kind are not regarded 
as reversible error, even when made by the plaintiff or 
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his witnesses, if the court takes prompt action to eradi-
cate such statements, although if the plaintiff himself 
makes such statement after admonition by the court, 
there is reversible error, and some cases hold that the 
mere statements by the plaintiff that defendant car .. 
ries liability insurance is reversible error." 
In the Tuttle case, there was a mere voluntary state-
ment of a witness, initially brought out by the defendants 
themselves on cross-examination, as to an insurance man. 
On pages 1488-9 of the last mentioned annotation, there 
appears the follownig statement: 
"Many courts take the position that if the fact 
that the defendant is insured, or facts leading to the 
inference that he is insured, ·come out naturally as an 
incident to a lawful inquiry without a wilful attempt 
to bring in this incompetent evidence, no reversible 
error occurs, even though they are not strictly rele-
vant or competent. And this would seem a most rea-
-sonable and just view to take of the matter; but a few 
courts go to the extreme of holding that the mere men-
tion of insurance in the course of a trial is so prejudi-
cial as to require a reversal (which the note refers to 
as including Oklahoma from which jurisdiction counsel 
for defendants have referred to cases) even where of-
fered to discredit a witness, the theory being that, 
while this evidence may be logically relevant, it is in-
admissible because it will result in confusion of issues 
of undue prejudice. But, as said by the. Te~as Court 
of Appeals, if any court has held that the mere mention 
of an insurance company in a personal injury or death 
case is sufficient to reverse the judgment, whether or 
not such mention had any effect on the case, it is best 
not to follow it, and to return to the domain of common 
sense and reason.'' 
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To the same effect are the annotations in 74 ALR 849, 
95 ALR 388 and 105 A~ 1088. In the annotation in 95 
ALR 388, at page 393, reference is made to the case of Al-
len v. Tatum, 11 N. J. Mis. R. 666, 167 A. 668, in which it 
was held that a denial of a mistrial was proper after a wit-
ness for plaintiff had said, when asked upon cross-examin-
ation why he had made a certain statement, "Just to get 
rid of the insurance man, I guess", plaintiff having. made 
no attempt to benefit by such mention of insurance and the 
trial court having charged the jury to disregard it. 
Of particular note here is the case Balle v. Smith, 81 
Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224, cited in the annotation 95 ALR 388; 
in that certain case the court said (P. 231) referring to a 
statement that the defendant \vas covered by insurance: 
"Whether the making of such remark is such mis-
conduct as required a reversal depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of the case, and particularly upon 
whether it was made for the purpose of injecting the 
subject of defendant's indemnity to prejudice the jury." 
We call attention to the following cases as mentiened 
in the annotation in 105 ALR 1324: 
"Plaintiff's voluntary reply to a question asked by 
defendant's counsel as to whether she had signed a 
statement, that she signed on for defendant's insurance 
man, having come naturally to a question that was not 
directed to any specific statement, was held not ob-
jectionable, and her later similar reply on redirect ex-
amination by her own counsel was held competent to 
show the circumstances under which a particular state-
ment was made, the situation having been invited by 
defendant, in Kaley v. HJuntley (1935). App. 
__ , 88 s. w. 2d 200. 
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"A plaintiff's testimony, when cross-examined by 
defendant's attorney, that the latter had stated that he 
could not take plaintiff's case because the insurance 
company had offered to employ him in the case, was 
said to have been clearly invited, and any error from 
its introduction was held cured by the court's instruc-
tion to disregard it, in Clark v. Patterson (1935) 190 
Ark. 148, 77 S. W. 2d 978 (master and servant case). 
"And the fact that the suggestion of insurance was 
first brought out upon defendant's cross-examination 
of plaintiff, in explaining how he happened to sign a 
statement at the request of a man who said he repre-
sented an insurance company, was held to render in-
. nocuous a later question to plaintiff, by his own coun,. 
sel, asking whether the man said that he was an in-
surance adjuster, and also unanticipated testimony of 
another witness as to defendant having said that he 
carried insurance, the jury having been instructed to 
disregard such question and testimony, in Raymond 
v. Sternberger (1935) 116 P. Super. Ct. 451, 176 A. 
787._'' 
There seems no possible merit in defendants' conten-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' entire case is predicated on the_ ~iction that 
Stevenson followed the Tuttle car, when in fact, he was fol-
lowing the Holt-Beardall car. Laboring under the errone-
ous assumption, Stevenson commented at the scene of the 
wreck that he had followed the car involved in the collision, 
which comment was seized up by the truck driver as an 
"out" from an entirely hopeless situation. The impres-
sions of the witnesses McPhies were predicated upOn such 
fiction. The investigators for the trucking company who 
spent considerable time with the driver and McPhies had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
this fiction in n1ind, \Vhile the Tuttles and Holt and Bear-
dall, who knew the direction Dale Tuttle was traveling, were 
locating Tuttle's people and at the hospital. The officer, 
who at first talked only to the truck driver and thus with 
this mistaken impression in mind, originally reported in ac-
cordance therewith, but \Vhen he heard both viewpoints, 
changed his report to show the fact that the deceased was 
traveling north. The theory of the appellants is a physi-
cal in1possibility, for if the vehicles had been traveling in 
the same direction, the lighter vehicle, hit broadside, would 
have been knocked farther to the south and to the right, 
whereas in fact, it stopped considerably north of the truck. 
The markings on the highway show that the Tuttle car 
\Vas going north, since the scuffing on the road was about 
at right angles to where the Tuttle car came to rest. 
The time element and the proved intentions and des-
tination of the deceased, confirm this.. The testimony of 
Beardall and Holt, as corroborated by numerous other wit-
nesses, including Mrs. Ellis, who rode with Mr. Stevenson, 
shows clearly that the Holt-Beardall car was in head of the 
Stevenson car and that when the collision occurred, the 
Holt-Beardall car immediately backed over to the east of 
the road and parked; whereas Stevenson, who came up lat-
er, stopped on the west side, saw no car in front of him on 
the west and assumed that the car he had been following 
was involved. The testimony is positive that there was no 
car on the west side of the road, but a car was approaching 
on the east side of the road ,coming north, which could have 
been only the Tuttle car. There is no question but that 
Tuttle met his death in the collision and that the defendant 
vehicle was on the-wrong side of- the road and out of con--
trol at the time and prior thereto. 
The defendants cannot deny that defendants' driver 
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was grossly negligent. His negligence was. calculated to, 
and did, cause death in view of the hazards existing at the 
time. The plaintiff's widow and her infant child were de-
prived of their husband and father by such negligence. 
They are entitled to recover. 
The entire defense was based upon the fiction that the 
deceased was traveling south. The arguments on appeal in 
defendants' brief are premised on the assumption that the 
deceased was going south, and his numerous cases princi-
pally relate to negligence under such circumstances, the law 
of which we do not dispute and never have disputed. Not 
one case is cited, nor argument advanced by defendants in 
their brief indicating that if the deceased were traveling 
north, there should be no recovery. No argument can be 
so advanced. The case has already been tried twice at a 
great burden to all parties, but particularly to the widow. 
No claim is made that the judgment is excessive. 
Because of abundant evidence, fully establishing all 
necessary elements of plaintiffs' case, the defendants' mo-
tions for a directed verdict and for a new trial were properly 
denied. 
The court did not commit prejudicial error in its in-
structions, and the issues were fairly presented to the jury. 
No prejudicial or any errer was committed in connec-
tion with insurance. The judgment is a just and proper one. It should be 
affirmed with costs to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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